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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant, Guadalupe Garcia-Carranza (hereinafter Guadalupe and/or
Appellant), appeals following a jury trial from a conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine, over 400 grams.
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion in
limine and allowing the state to elicit the street value in eight balls and teeners of
the two and one quarter pounds of methamphetamine that was being sold at the
wholesale level in pounds.
Course of Proceedings
On April 18, 2016, a complaint was filed charging Guadalupe with
trafficking in methamphetamine over 400 grams. (R. 9-10.) The state moved to
consolidate the case with that of Guadalupe’s brother, Alejandro GarciaCarranza (hereinafter Alejandro), and Jesus Esteban Castro-Angulo (hereinafter
Jesus). (R. p. 13-14.) The court granted the motion to consolidate. (R. p. 15.)
A grand jury indictment was then filed charging Guadalupe with trafficking
in methamphetamine over 400 grams (the others were also indicted and the
cases remained consolidated in the district court). (R. p. 28-29.)
The matter proceeded to jury trial, but a mistrial was declared based on
the questioning by co-counsel of a state’s witness. (R. p. 64-78.)
Based on what had transpired in the first trial, Guadalupe brought a
motion in limine to exclude the state from eliciting testimony regarding the street
(versus wholesale) value of the drugs as irrelevant to the elements of the offense
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and as unduly prejudicial and inflammatory. (R. p. 81-83.) The court denied the
motion. (R. p. 85.)
The matter proceeded to trial again, and the jury found Guadalupe (as well
as the others) guilty as charged. (R. p. 86-101.)
Guadalupe was sentenced to 25 years in prison with the first 10 years
fixed. (R. p. 128.)
Guadalupe timely appeals. (R. p. 131-133.)
Statement of the Facts
While the cases of Guadalupe and the co-defendants were consolidated
below, they are not consolidated on appeal.1 Since co-defendant Alejandro has
succinctly described the trial evidence in his already filed brief, Appellant will
simply reiterate the relevant portions of his statement of facts (with citations to
Guadalupe’s transcript since the pagination is different).
On

December

16,

2015,

Luis

Soria

sold

a

half-pound

of

methamphetamine to an undercover detective (“UC”). (Tr. p. 212, ln. 19 - p. 213,
ln. 6.) Luis put the UC in touch with his source of supply, later identified as Jesus
Esteban Castro-Angulo, and the two agreed to meet at a later time. (Id. at p. 213,
ln. 23 - p. 214, ln. 23; p. 277, ln. 10-20.) After communicating by phone and text,
the UC and Jesus met in person on January 13, 2016, in Twin Falls where they
discussed meth prices in the UC’s undercover pickup. (Tr. p. 215, ln. 15 – p. 216,
ln. 2; p. 216, ln. 18 - p. 217, ln. 19; p. 266, ln. 16-24; p. 269, ln. 6 - p. 270, ln. 5;
Exh. 1, Exh 1A; Exh. 3, Exh. 3A.) Jesus agreed to sell the UC a quarter-pound of
Alejandro Garcia-Carranza’s case is Docket No. 44879.
Castro’s case is Docket No. 44860.
1
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Jesus Esteban

meth for $2300, which he could have ready in twenty minutes. (Tr. p. 275, ln. 612; p. 277, ln. 21 - p. 278, ln. 3; Exh. 3, Exh. 3A.) Jesus left to obtain the
methamphetamine

and,

approximately

thirty

minutes

later,

returned

and entered the UC’s pickup. (Tr. p. 288, ln. 9-21; p. 298, ln. 8-24; p. 299, ln. 619.)
Jesus and the UC completed the quarter pound purchase, and the UC
then dropped Jesus off. (Tr. p. 302, ln. 2-20; Exh. 3, Exh. 3B.) The UC and Jesus
continued to communicate via phone and text regarding future purchases. (Tr. p.
217, ln. 24 – p. 218, ln. 2; p. 323, ln. 4 - p. 327, ln. 1; Exh. 1, p. 2-3; Exh. 1A p. 23.) Jesus then contacted the UC from a new number and indicated that while
things had been dry, he hoped to have “veggies” soon. (Tr. p. 328, ln. 20 329, ln. 24; p. 330, ln. 6-17. Exh. 8A.) The UC then changed his phone number
to keep up his appearance as a legitimate drug dealer. (Tr. p. 332, ln. 25 - p. 333,
ln. 9.) Via the UC’s new number, the UC and Jesus agreed that Jesus would
deliver two and a quarter pounds of meth to the UC at a McDonald’s in Boise on
April 15, 2016. (Tr. p. 218, ln. 3-12; Exh. 9, p. 1-2; Exh. 9A, p. 1-2.) The UC
agreed to pay $16,000 for the two pounds, and Jesus agreed to front the quarterpound to the UC. (Tr. p. 340, ln. 3-20; p. 341, ln. 14 - p. 342, ln. 8.) The UC told
Jesus he was driving the same pickup and instructed Jesus on where his vehicle
was parked. (Tr. p. 345, ln. 7-9; Exh. 10A.) Once Jesus parked next to the UC’s
pickup, law enforcement descended on the vehicle with weapons drawn. (Tr. p.
510, ln. 3 - p. 511, ln. 3; p. 531, ln. 6-12; p. 584, ln. 22 - p. 585, ln. 4.)
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Alejandro — completely unknown to law enforcement — was found in the
backseat behind the driver. Police found the meth in Doritos and Cheetos chip
bags in the front passenger area, where Alejandro’s older brother, Guadalupe
Garcia-Carranza (“Lupe”)--had been seated. (Tr. p. 543, ln. 22 – 544, ln. 2.)
The total weight of the methamphetamine was 1006.5 grams, or about 2
1/4 pounds. (Tr. p. 378, ln. 7 – p. 382, ln. 1.) When Guadalupe was removed
from the vehicle he had two bindles in his pocket. (Tr. p. 538, ln. 2-7.)

One

bindle had .28 grams of methamphetamine and the other contained unweighable
methamphetamine residue. (Tr. p. 375, ln. 16 – p. 377, ln. 11.)

4

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND
ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE OF THE STREET VALUE OF DRUGS WHICH WAS
NOT RELEVANT TO THE TRAFFICKING CHARGE
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE MOTION IN LIMINE AND ALLOWING
IN EVIDENCE ON THE STREET VALUE OF DRUGS WHICH WAS NOT
RELEVANT TO THE TRAFFICKING CHARGE
A.

Standard of Review
The various standards of review applicable to this case were described

by the Supreme Court in State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 304 P.3d 276 (2013):
A trial court has "broad discretion" in determining whether to admit
or exclude evidence, "and its judgment in the fact finding role will
only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion." However, whether evidence is relevant is a question of
law this Court reviews de novo. "A three point inquiry is used to
determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion: (1)
whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason."
Id., p. 6 (internal citations omitted).
The district court’s determination that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574, 388 P.3d 583, 588 (2017).
B.

The motion in limine, the court’s ruling, and the evidence
Prior to trial, Guadalupe moved in limine to exclude evidence of the

value of the 2¼ pounds of methamphetamine seized if broken down into street
weights such as an eighth of an ounce (8 ball) or sixteenth of an ounce (teener).
(R. 81-83.) He was not contesting admissibility of the sale price of $16,000. (Tr.
p. 18, lns. 17-20.)
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According to the motion, at the first trial (which ended in mistrial), the state
introduced over objection evidence of the street value of the methamphetamine
down to an ounce, an 8 ball, and a teener. (R. 82.) The motion explained that the
elements of the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine were, inter alia, as
follows:
1. On or about April 15, 2016
2. in the state of Idaho
3. the defendant Guadalupe
methamphetamine,

Garda-Carranza

possessed

4. the defendant knew it was methamphetamine, and
5. possessed at least 400 grams of methamphetamine or any
mixture or substance with a detectable amount of
methamphetamine.
Motion in Limine p. 1. (R. p. 81-82.)
The motion pointed out that none of these elements include value. (R. p.
82.) Thus, the evidence was not relevant in that it did not have any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Evidence (IRE) 401.
The motion also argued that the evidence of value confuses the issue and
is unfairly prejudicial.

Even if relevant, the probative value at most is minimal

since value is not an issue, but the danger of unfair prejudice is high in that it has
an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, to wit, an
emotional one. (R. p. 83.)
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The motion was taken up right before trial.

After hearing the state’s

argument (it filed no written response) Defense counsel argued inter alia, the
prosecution wanted to be able to argue the effect on the community that this
large amount would have when broken up into street amounts. In other words,
the improper argument is the street level consequences of sale on the streets of
Ada County. (Tr. p. 22, lns. 8-11; p. 23 lns. 8-11.)
The court denied the motion:
But it is, in my view it is very relevant when there is a valuable
object and multiple people are involved in its transportation and
delivery to consider the inference that a person would not let
people accompany them delivering valuable objects, unless they
were also participants in the same project.
I think it is highly relevant. I think it is very probative. And I do not
think it is unfairly prejudicial. I am going to deny the motion in
limine. Obviously I am not going to permit some improper
argument appealing to the sediments [sic] of the jury.
But it is quite logical that if a person is moving an illegal, valuable
object that they would not feel comfortable with inviting the sisters
of charity to join them. And so I think that it's part of the inferences
that can be drawn. The jury is entitled to draw inferences from
direct and circumstantial evidence. And it seems to me that this is
very relevant. And its relevant and probative value outweighs any
prejudicial effect and the motion is denied.
Tr. p. 23, ln. 17- p. 24, ln. 14.
The court did state the issue was adequately preserved for appeal and the
objection was continuing and there was no need to object during trial. (Tr. p. 25,
lns.10-18.)
At trial the prosecution asked whether the UC could explain to the jury and
put into context the 2¼ pounds of methamphetamine as it relates to street-level
distribution. (Tr. p. 435, lns. 21-24.) The UC testified:
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A. I can. That 1 pound can -- if I was to buy that 1 pound of
methamphetamine and I took it, I could resell it out on the street or
to another distributor, such as the role that I'm playing. I could sell
it in ounces, sell it in quarter pounds depending on the type of
clientele that I had.
Tr. p. 435, ln. 25-p. 436, ln. 5 (emphasis added).
As to prices, the UC continued:
If I was selling it by ounces, I could obtain anywhere between -well, prices at that time and right now, probably about $450 to $800
per ounce of that methamphetamine.
If I broke it down even more and sold at lower levels, I could sell it
at an eighth of an ounce, or commonly known as an eight ball.
Now, the eight balls will go for 120 to $200 per eight ball for one
eighth of an ounce, or 3 1/2 grams.
If I broke it down even further, I could go down to what is called a
teener, a 16th of an ounce, or 1.75 grams, and I could sell that
anywhere between 70 to maybe $90 per teener.
Tr. p. 436, lns. 6-19.
The UC also testified that an 8 ball and a teener are common phrases. (Tr.
p. 436, ln. 21-p. 437, ln. 4.)
The prosecutor then asked:
Q. So when we're talking this large amount, a thousand grams, can
you give them an idea of what a gram looks like, what a quantity of
a gram is?
A. Well, I guess the simplest way would be like a Sweet'n Low
packet. The contents that are inside a Sweet'n Low packet is 1
gram. Not the package itself, but what the contents inside. A
Sweet'n Low package, that's 1 gram.
So a teener would be 1 3/4. That 1 gram that's in there plus three
quarters more of another.
Tr. p. 437, lns. 5-16.
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The UC testified that actual drug users use different amounts depending
on their tolerance and the quality. (Tr. p. 437, lns. 17-20.)
Finally, in response to the prosecutor’s specific question, the UC testified
that some distributors cut the substances to increase the yield, so if the 2¼
pounds were cut, there would be even more methamphetamine to distribute. (Tr.
p. 437, ln. 21-p. 438, ln. 5.)
The examination then went back to the prices:
Q. Okay. And so just explain to the jury your understanding, again
based upon your training and experience, of -- as a distributor, the
value of this 2 1/4 pounds of methamphetamine.
A. Well, at wholesale, I was going to be paying $16,000 for the 2
pounds. But if I broke it down into quarter pounds or smaller than
that, I would be making more money.
Q. Can you give us a range based upon the figures you've
previously discussed, 450 to 800 for an ounce, or 28 grams?
.
.
.
THE WITNESS: I would need a calculator, but right now the price - the prices right now at the low end is $450 per ounce. So I would
multiply that by 16 because there's 16 ounces in a pound.
Q. BY [PROSECUTOR]: And you do that twice?
A. Yes.
Q. And then again for the quarter pound; correct?
A. Exactly.
Q. Okay. And so the methamphetamine recovered on April 15,
2016, during your investigation is valuable not only because you
were paying 16,000 for it, but also based upon how it could be
distributed?
A. Absolutely.
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Tr. p. 438, ln. 6- p. 439, ln. 12.
C.

The court erred in denying the motion in limine and allowing in the

evidence of value and distribution
To begin with, the evidence was not relevant to anything at issue in the
case. The controlling rules of evidence follow:
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 401. Definition of Relevant Evidence.
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 402. Relevant Evidence Generally
Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by
these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
I.R.E. 401 & 402.
As correctly argued below, the value of the methamphetamine beyond the
sales price here, $16,000, had absolutely no tendency to make any fact of
consequence to the action more or less probable than without the evidence.
All that had to be established to convict Guadalupe of trafficking in
methamphetamine was to show that he was in possession of methamphetamine,
knew it was methamphetamine, and the amount. In other words, value was not at
issue, only quantity was.
The court ruled that the methamphetamine was valuable and thus there is
an inference that Guadalupe and Alejandro were participants because otherwise
they would not have been along for a delivery of a valuable and illegal object.
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This may well be correct for the sale price of the methamphetamine, $16,000,
which was not challenged. The inference stops there, however, because
regardless of how much the methamphetamine may have been worth when
broken down to the ultimate user level, it was not, and never would be, worth
more than $16,000 to the defendants in this case because that is how much it
was being sold for. Whether the methamphetamine would be worth one dollar or
a million dollars after it went to the UC simply does not make any fact of
consequence, to wit, whether Guadalupe possessed it or knew what it was, any
more probable than without the street values.
This case simply was not about street level sales of methamphetamine.
Significantly, the UC himself said the role he was playing was a distributor, not
street level dealer. Even farther afield is the evidence that some distributors
increase the yield through cutting the product. It simply makes no sense that
someone else’s potential return on their investment makes it more probable that
Guadalupe possessed methamphetamine or knew it was methamphetamine.
In short, the street value or evidence regarding the breakdown of the
methamphetamine to a street or user level was not relevant, and the court erred
by holding otherwise and admitting the evidence.
Next, assuming arguendo that this evidence had some sort of probative
value, it was slight indeed and so was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403:
Idaho Rules of Evidence Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time.
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Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
I.R.E. 403
In our case, while the UC did not do the math because he did not have a
calculator, the jury certainly could have since it had more time. The 2¼ pounds
is the equivalent of 1,750 teener doses. The maximum value using the UC’s
figures, which actually was the high end of the range for 8 balls, was $57,600.
And this is without the hypothetical cutting of the methamphetamine to increase
the number of doses.
The danger of unfair prejudice here is the jury considering improper
grounds for conviction, to wit, one based on emotion due to the impact on the
community.

In other words, the state gratuitously alerted the jury as to the

greater impact this amount of methamphetamine would have on the community
once it was broken down (which had nothing to do with the case). Thus, the jury
was more likely to convict simply based on the increased danger to their
community they perceived was caused by the defendant, rather than by
reference to the evidence against the defendant.
The same is true for the street value of the drug when broken down into
teeners, it portrays the amount of drugs as larger and therefore more deserving
as punishment, when nothing at all has changed in terms of the defendant’s
supposed benefit from them. The alleged sale price was still $16,000 for the two
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pounds and presumably $2,300 for the front of the quarter pound (this is what it
was before), and not the theoretical maximum of $57,600.
The district court, however, abused its discretion when it ruled that the
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. This is because the court thought the high value of the
methamphetamine was very probative because that gave rise to the inference
that others along for its delivery were participants. However, as explained above,
this only went so far as the actual wholesale sales price, not the street price.
Thus, since the district court got this wrong, its weighing analysis was based on a
faulty premise and therefore was not an exercise of reason.
D.

The error was not harmless
The Supreme Court in Joy also described Idaho’s harmless error test:
This Court applies the harmless error test articulated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). Under the two-part
Chapman test, the defendant must establish the existence of an
error, "at which point the State shall have the burden of
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. To meet that burden, the State must "prove[ ] ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.’" Id. at 221, 245 P.3d at 973 (quoting
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710). . . .
.

.

.

Thus, an appellate court's inquiry "is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 189
(1993).
Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.

14

Here, Appellant has established the existence of the error, and the state
now has the burden of proving the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
That said, Appellant makes the following comments and asserts that the state will
be unable to meet its burden.
Guadalupe was not the person the UC made the deal with or had sold
methamphetamine to the UC before, that was co-defendant Jesus.

Guadalupe

just happened to be there when Jesus showed up and was arrested.

He had

not been on law enforcement radar, he did not make any admissions, the large
amounts of drugs were simply found in snack food bags in the passenger area of
the vehicle where he had been sitting, which was also within reach of the others.
While very small amounts of methamphetamine were found in bindles in his
pocket (one just residue), this shows at most he is a drug user, not a wholesaler
of two pound quantities of methamphetamine.
Because of the lack of evidence against Guadalupe, the prosecutor had to
argue the street value evidence in closing:
As I mentioned, the value is not just the 16,000, there is the
potential value as well. You heard from Detective Bustos about how
this amount of methamphetamine can be distributed down
to a teener, which is 1.75 grams, an eight ball, which is 3.5 grams
common weight. You have an example of how far down
methamphetamine can be divided. This is .28 grams, not an
uncommon weight of methamphetamine for an individual to put
up. So the potential value is beyond the $16,000. This is a valuable
product. This is an illegal enterprise.
Tr. p. 767, lns. 14-25.2
Not incidentally, the state’s argument shows that the evidence that the drugs
have more value than $16,000 does absolutely nothing to prove that Guadalupe
possessed the methamphetamine and is not relevant.
2
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This evidence was either inadmissible as irrelevant or inadmissible
because the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its arguable
slight probative value. Either way, by being able to consider that evidence the
jury was able to convict Guadalupe, not based on the actual evidence against
him, but on the impact that the large amount of methamphetamine would have
had on the community.
CONCLUSION
Appellant requests this Court reverse and vacate his conviction and
remand this matter for a new trial.
DATED this 24th day of April, 2018.
/s/ Greg S. Silvey
Greg S. Silvey
Attorney for Appellant
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